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I n	§9	of	the	Critique of Judgment,	Kant	raises	a	question	that	he	flags	as	the	“key	to	the	critique	of	taste”.	He	has	already	argued	that	a	judgment	of	beauty	has	an	essential	relation	to	the	feeling	of	plea-
sure;	 the	key	question	in	§9	 is	whether	“the	feeling	of	pleasure	[das 
Gefühl der Lust]	precedes	the	judging	of	the	[beautiful]	object	or	the	lat-
ter	precedes	the	former”	(5:216).	In	response,	Kant	immediately	rules	
out	the	former	answer	and	appears	to	commit	himself	to	the	following	
thesis:
JUDGMENT GROUNDS FEELING	(J→F):	A	judgment	of	
beauty	must	ground	the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	a	beautiful	
object.1
Kant’s	reasons	for	asserting	J→F	are	as	follows:	If,	on	the	contrary,	the	
judgment	of	beauty	were	grounded	in	a	feeling	of	pleasure,	then,	ac-
cording	 to	him,	 it	could	only	amount	 to	a	 report	of	one’s	subjective	
liking	for	the	beautiful	object.2	But	a	criterial	feature	of	a	judgment	of	
beauty,	on	Kant’s	view,	is	that	it	is	not	merely	an	expression	of	one’s	
subjective	preference.	Rather,	a	judgment	of	beauty	makes	a	claim	to	
“universal	 validity”:	 it	 claims,	 that	 is,	 that	 it	 is	 correct	 to	—	or,	 equiva-
lently,	that	everyone	ought to	—	find	the	judged	object	beautiful.	This	is	
possible,	Kant	argues,	only	if	the	pleasure	is	a	consequence	of	judging.
Unfortunately,	 J→F	 immediately	raises	a	problem.	For	 it	 is	 in	 ten-
sion	with	another	thesis	that	Kant	appears	equally	committed	to:
FEELING GROUNDS JUDGMENT	(F→J):	A	judgment	of	
beauty	is	aesthetic,	that	is,	grounded	in	feeling.3
1.	 I	will	leave	the	sense	of	‘ground’	here	ambiguous	for	now,	since	in	order	to	
further	specify	it,	one	must	commit	oneself	to	a	particular	interpretation	of	
the	relation	between	the	judgment	of	beauty	and	the	feeling	of	pleasure.
2.	 “If	the	pleasure	in	the	given	object	came	first,	and	only	its	universal	commu-
nicability	were	to	be	attributed	in	the	judgment	of	taste	to	the	representation	
of	 the	object,	 then	 such	a	procedure	would	be	 self-contradictory.	For	 such	
a	pleasure	would	be	none	other	than	mere	agreeableness	in	sensation,	and	
hence	by	its	very	nature	could	have	only	private	validity	…”	(5:217).
3.	 E.g.:	“The	judgment	is	also	called	aesthetic	precisely	because	its	determining	
ground	is	not	a	concept	but	[a]	feeling	…”	(5:228).
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feeling	of	pleasure.	As	I	will	explain,	my	view	can	avoid	this	troubling	
consequence.
1 Accounts of §9
1.1 Guyer’s Two-Act View (J1→F → J2)
In	Kant and the Claims of Taste,	Paul	Guyer	attempts	to	solve	the	puzzle	
of	§9	by	claiming	 that	 the	 judgment	of	beauty	 involves	 two	distinct	
acts	of	 judgment	 (Guyer,	Claims of Taste,	 esp.	97–9).	 In	 the	first,	 the	
subject	submits	the	object	to	her	“estimation”	by	engaging	in	an	act	
of	“simple	reflection”.	If	the	object	is	beautiful,	this	first	act	of	judging	
gives	rise	to	what	Kant	calls	the	“harmony	of	the	faculties”:	the	agree-
ment	between	the	cognitive	faculties	of	imagination	and	understand-
ing	that,	on	Kant’s	view,	 is	tied	to	the	distinctive	pleasure	felt	 in	the	
beautiful.	The	feeling	of	pleasure	caused	by	the	harmony	of	the	facul-
ties	is	then	followed	by	a	second	judgment	—	which	Guyer	considers	
the	judgment	of	beauty	proper	—	during	which	the	subject	examines	
the	source	of	her	pleasure	and,	determining	it	to	be	the	harmony	of	
her	faculties,	judges	it	to	be	universally	valid.	On	Guyer’s	view,	then,	
the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	is	consequent	on	a	first,	general	
act	of	 judging	 (J1→F);	 this	pleasure	 then	serves	as	 the	object	of	 the	
judgment	of	beauty	proper	that	claims	its	universal	validity	(F→J2).
Unfortunately,	 however,	 §9	makes	 clear	 that	 pleasure	must	 be	 a	
consequence	of	the	judgment of beauty	itself	and	not	some	prior	act	of	
judging	(5:217).	Guyer	concedes	this,	but	suggests	that	Kant	is	being	
sloppy	here	by	allowing	a	previously	held	aesthetic	view	—	on	which	
aesthetic	response	is	tied	to	social	communicability	—	to	creep	into	a	
mature	 view	with	 which	 that	 characterization	 is	 inconsistent	 (Ibid.,	
139–40).	As	many	commentators	have	noted,	however,	it	is	rather	un-
charitable	to	attribute	such	an	error	to	Kant	especially	in	the	very	sec-
tion	that	he	describes	as	“key	to	the	critique	of	taste”	and	“worthy	of	
full	attention”	(5:216).
The	 judgment	 ‘X	 is	beautiful’,	according	 to	Kant,	 is	essentially	differ-
ent	 from	a	cognitive	 judgment	 like	 ‘X	 is	a	 triangle’.	Whereas	 the	 lat-
ter	 judgment	relies	on	a	conceptual	 rule	by	which	one	can	pick	out	
instances	of	triangles,	the	former	is	aesthetic	—	that	is,	it	is	made	not	
in	accordance	with	rules	that	specify	what	counts	as	a	beautiful	object,	
but	rather	on	the	basis	of	the	subject’s	feeling.	Properly	translated,	then,	
the	judgment	‘X	is	beautiful’	claims	that	the	feeling	that	the	beautiful	
object	gives	rise	to	in	the	subject	is	universally	valid.
The	puzzle	of	§9	has	to	do	with	reconciling	 J→F	and	F→J.	A	suc-
cessful	 account	of	 the	 structure	of	Kant’s	 judgments	of	beauty	must	
explain,	in	other	words,	how	the	subject’s	feeling	of	pleasure	in	a	beau-
tiful	object	could	be	grounded	in,	and	therefore	consequent	on,	her	
judging,	even	though	Kant	makes	clear	that	she	judges	on	the	basis	of	
her	feeling	in	the	beautiful.
Resolving	this	puzzle	has	been	a	central	goal	for	commentators	in	
the	last	few	decades	of	work	on	the	Critique of Judgment.	Most	attempts	
at	 a	 solution,	 however,	 have	 required	 ignoring	 or	modifying	 signifi-
cant	portions	of	Kant’s	text.	In	this	paper,	I	will	propose	an	interpreta-
tion	that	avoids	these	extreme	measures.	As	I	will	discuss,	Kant’s	text	
indicates	that	he	posits	two	distinct	feelings	in	the	beautiful:	the	first,	
the	ground	of	judgments	of	beauty	(F1→J);	the	second,	the	feeling	of	
pleasure	consequent	on	judging	(J→F2).	As	such,	the	two	theses	above	
are	consistent.
In	§1,	I	briefly	rehearse	and	criticize	two	prominent	attempts	to	re-
spond	to	the	puzzle	of	§9.	In	doing	so,	I	hope	to	motivate	the	alterna-
tive	account	of	the	structure	of	judgments	of	beauty	that	I	develop	and	
defend	in	§2.	Finally,	in	§3,	I	argue	that	a	virtue	of	my	account	is	that	
it	can	help	to	resolve	another	notorious	problem	that	arises	for	Kant’s	
“Deduction”	of	judgments	of	beauty.	Kant	argues	in	the	Deduction	that	
we	 are	 entitled	 to	 claim	 universal	 validity	 for	 judgments	 of	 beauty	
because	they	are	grounded	in	a	state	that	is	a	necessary	condition	of	
judgment	 in	 general.	 Interpreters	 have	 worried	 that	 this	 attempted	
deduction	has	the	consequence	that	all	 judgments	must	 involve	the	
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what	goes	on	when	we	judge	an	object	to	be	beautiful”	(Ibid.,	34).	The	
suggestion	 that	an	experience	of	beauty	consists	 in	being	 in	a	 state	
that	reflexively	approves	of	itself	but	is	otherwise	empty	of	content	is	
odd,	to	say	the	least.	Adding	to	the	implausibility	 is	the	fact	that	be-
ing	in	the	state	in	question	appears	to	set	the	subject	off	on	a	fruitless	
regress	—	one	in	which	the	state	she	judges	to	be	universally	valid	is	
just	the	state	of	judging	to	be	universally	valid	the	state	of	judging	to	
be	universally	valid…	and	so	on.
It	must	 also	 be	 noted	 that	—	notwithstanding	 its	 ability	 to	 recon-
cile	 the	problematic	 theses	 in	§9	—	Ginsborg’s	view	bears	an	uneasy	
relationship	 to	 Kant’s	 text.	 For	 one,	 if	 Kant’s	 view	 really	 is	 that	 the	
judgment	of	beauty	consists	in	only	one	act	of	pleasurable	judgment,	
it	is	strange	that	he	should	say	that	the	“key”	question	of	his	account	
concerns	whether	“the	feeling	of	pleasure	precedes	the	judging	…	or	
the	latter	precedes	the	former”	and	seemingly	affirm	the	latter	option	
(5:216).5
Finally,	 the	 austerity	 of	 Ginsborg’s	 account	 of	 the	 mental	 state	
that	grounds	the	judgment	of	beauty	 is	 in	tension	with	Kant’s	many	
5.	 These	particular	worries	do	not	arise	for	the	one-act	view	that	Rachel	Zuck-
ert	 argues	 for	 in	Kant on Beauty and Biology,	 since	 she	disagrees	with	Gins-
borg	that	the	judgment	of	beauty	is	identical	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure.	On	
Zuckert’s	view,	J→F	correctly	expresses	Kant’s	thesis	that	aesthetic	judging	is	
“transcendentally	prior”	(310)	to	—	that	is,	is	a	necessary	condition	for	the	pos-
sibility	of	—	aesthetic	pleasure	in	the	beautiful.	As	for	the	passages	that	sug-
gest	that	feeling	precedes	the	judgment	of	beauty,	Zuckert	argues	that	these	
are	merely	meant	to	pick	out	an	“order	in	knowledge”	(330)	—	viz.,	that	it	is	
in	virtue	of	being	conscious	of	her	aesthetic	pleasure	 that	 the	 subject	first	
expresses	her	experience	of	the	object	as	beautiful.	The	problem	with	Zuck-
ert’s	reading,	however,	is	that	it	cannot	do	justice	to	F→J:	as	I	have	discussed,	
Kant	makes	clear	that	it	is	not	merely	the	case	that	judgments	of	beauty	are	
expressed	through	feeling,	but	rather	that	the	determining ground	of	such	judg-
ments	—	that	is,	the	basis	on	which	they	are	made	—	is	itself	a	feeling.	Zuck-
ert’s	view	conflicts	with	this	central	claim;	indeed,	she	is	forced	to	conclude	
that	 these	assertions	of	Kant’s	are	 “mischaracterizations	of	 the	structure	of	
aesthetic	judging”	(330).	On	my	view,	F→J	is	as	central	to	Kant’s	view	as	J→F;	
in	 fact,	he	treats	 the	 former	as	definitional	of	 their	status	as	aesthetic	 judg-
ments	(5:228).	As	such,	I	think	Ginsborg	is	right	to	argue	that	a	one-act	view	
can	do	justice	to	both	J→F	and	F→J	only	if	it	identifies	the	judgment	of	beauty	
and	the	pleasure.
1.2 Ginsborg’s One-Act View (J↔F)
In	“On	the	Key	to	Kant’s	Critique	of	Taste”,4	Hannah	Ginsborg	rejects	
Guyer’s	two-act	view	of	judgments	of	beauty	and	attempts	instead	to	
take	Kant’s	claims	in	§9	at	face	value.	In	order	to	reconcile	the	theses	
J→F	and	F→J,	she	suggests	that	the	judgment	of	beauty	is	identical	with	
the	feeling	of	pleasure	(J↔F).	On	her	“one-act”	view,	to	make	a	judg-
ment	of	beauty	is	to	be	in	a	mental	state	that	reflexively	claims	its	own 
universal	validity	and	is	“manifest	to	consciousness”	(Ginsborg,	“On	
the	Key”,	41)	through	a	feeling	of	pleasure.	Ginsborg	describes	this	as	
follows:
I	take	my	mental	state	in	perceiving	an	object	to	be	uni-
versally	communicable,	where	my	mental	state	is	nothing	
other	than	the	mental	state	of	performing	that	very	act	of	
judgment,	that	is,	of	taking	my	mental	state	in	the	object	
to	be	universally	communicable.	…	The	act	of	self-refer-
entially	taking	my	mental	state	to	be	universally	commu-
nicable	with	respect	to	a	given	object	consists,	phenom-
enologically,	in	a	feeling	of	pleasure	in	that	object	(Ibid.,	
41).
Ginsborg’s	 interpretation	 succeeds	 in	 reconciling	 the	 two	 theses	 in	
question	without	 reading	 into	 the	Critique of Judgment	 two	 separate	
acts	of	judging.	If	a	feeling	of	pleasure	is	the	phenomenological	mani-
festation	of	the	judgment	of	beauty,	then	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	can	
be	said	to	be	grounded	in	the	judgment	of	beauty	(J→F).	And	since	
the	 judging	 is	phenomenologically	manifest	as	a	 feeling	of	pleasure,	
it	counts	as	a	judgment	that	is	aesthetic	and	made	through	pleasure	
(F→J).	Furthermore,	since	the	pleasurable	state	is	one	that	reflects	on	
and	claims	its	own	universal	validity,	it	can	be	said	that	the	judgment	
of	beauty	claims	the	universal	validity	of	the	pleasure.
Despite	these	advantages,	the	resulting	proposal	is	—	in	Ginsborg’s	
own	 words	—	an	 “unusual	 and	 initially	 counter-intuitive	 model	 of	
4.	 In	Ginsborg,	The Normativity of Nature,	32–52.
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To	accommodate	his	 view,	 as	we	 saw,	Guyer	has	 to	 charge	Kant	
with	extreme	sloppiness	in	§9.	Ginsborg	succeeds	in	absolving	him	of	
that	charge	only	by	making	much	of	the	discussion	in	that	section	mis-
leading	or	redundant.	She	attempts	to	mitigate	this	by	pointing	to	“dif-
ferences	between	eighteenth-century	and	twentieth-century	modes	of	
philosophical	expression”	(Ginsborg,	“On	the	Key”,	52),	but	I	think	it	
is	clear	that	an	interpretation	that	is	able	to	integrate	and	make	sense	
of	more	of	Kant’s	discussion,	if	possible,	is	to	be	preferred.7	In	the	next	
section,	I	will	propose	such	an	interpretation.
2 Two Feelings in the Beautiful (F1→J→F2)
My	goal	in	this	section	is	to	develop	a	view	that	solves	the	puzzle	of	§9	
while	incorporating	a	more	robust	conception	of	the	harmony	of	the	
faculties	that	is	a	central	component	of	Kant’s	account.
2.1 The Proposal
Let	me	begin	by	noting	that	Kant	states	clearly	that	(1)	the	harmonious	
free	play	of	the	faculties	is	the	determining	ground	of	the	judgment	of	
beauty;	and	(2)	this	harmony	can	be	felt	by	the	subject.	At	5:228,	for	
purposes	to	note	that	Kant	clearly	does	allow	for	such	a	free	harmony	in	the	
Critique of Judgment.
7.	 In	Kant’s Theory of Taste,	Henry	Allison	follows	Kant’s	text	in	assigning	a	sig-
nificant	role	to	the	harmony	of	the	faculties.	According	to	Allison,	the	faculty	
of	feeling	is	a	“faculty	of	appraisal”	(69)	through	which	the	subject	senses	her	
own	mental	state.	On	his	view,	the	subject	is	capable	—	through	her	feeling	
of	pleasure	or	displeasure	—	of	 judging	 “the	capacity	of	a	 representation	 to	
occasion	an	enhancement	or	diminution	of	[her]	cognitive	faculties	in	their	
cooperative	activity”	(130).	For	Allison,	then,	the	subject	senses	the	harmony	
of	her	faculties	through	a	feeling	of	pleasure,	and	this	felt	pleasure	grounds	
the	judgment	of	beauty.	It	is	clear	that	on	his	account,	the	judgment	of	beauty	
proper	is	based	on	pleasure;	as	such,	it	violates	J→F	and	does	not	provide	a	
solution	 to	 the	puzzle	under	discussion.	 In	commenting	on	 the	puzzle,	Al-
lison	says	that	some	version	of	Guyer’s	solution	—	“although	it	conflicts	with	
Kant’s	language	in	the	passage	in	question”	—	“seems	called	for	…	and	does	
provide	a	solution	to	the	…	problem”	(112).	For	reasons	that	will	become	clear	
in	the	next	section,	I	think	Allison	is	right	to	stress	the	importance	of	the	har-
mony	of	the	faculties,	but	wrong	to	identify	the	feeling	of	harmony	and	the	
feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	beautiful.
descriptions	of	it.	He	characterizes	the	state	as	one	in	which	the	cogni-
tive	 faculties	of	 the	 imagination	and	 the	understanding	are	 in	a	har-
monious free play.	When	making	an	ordinary	cognitive	judgment,	the	
imagination	synthesizes	the	manifold	of	intuition	in	a	manner	that	is	
determined	by	an	appropriate	concept	supplied	by	the	understanding.	
In	 this	way,	 imagination	and	understanding	work	 together	 to	gener-
ate	an	objective	representation	that	has	both	intuitive	and	conceptual	
content.	In	the	case	of	beauty,	in	contrast,	the	relation	between	imagi-
nation	and	understanding	 is	 a	 “free	play”:	on	Kant’s	view,	as	 I	have	
mentioned,	conceptual	rules	do	not	determine	a	judgment	of	beauty,	
and	so	the	imagination	synthesizes	freely,	without	direction	by	the	un-
derstanding.	But	the	output	of	this	free	synthesis	of	the	imagination	is	
nevertheless	meant	to	be	in	agreement	with	the	conditions	of	the	un-
derstanding;	as	Kant	puts	it,	“the	former	in	its	freedom	is	in	harmony	
with	the	latter	in	its	lawfulness”	(5:287).
The	sensed	harmony	of	the	faculties	that	occurs	in	response	to	rep-
resenting	a	beautiful	object	is,	on	Kant’s	view,	the	fundamental	basis	
of	the	pleasure	in	the	beautiful,	and	as	such,	he	offers	up	many	rich	
descriptions	of	 it.	 For	 example,	Kant	describes	 this	 state	 in	§9	 itself	
as	one	of	 the	 “animation	of	both	 faculties	 (the	 imagination	and	 the	
understanding)	 to	 an	activity	 that	 is	 indeterminate	but	 yet,	 through	
the	stimulus	of	the	given	representation,	in	unison”.	When	she	has	an	
experience	of	the	beautiful,	he	says,	the	subject	senses	“the	effect	that	
consists	in	the	facilitated	play	of	both	powers	of	the	mind	(imagination	
and	 understanding),	 enlivened	 through	 mutual	 agreement”	 (5:219).	
Ginsborg	must	disregard	these	many	descriptions	of	the	mental	state	
that	Kant	claims	is	involved	in	making	a	judgment	of	beauty,	since,	on	
her	view,	 its	only	content	 is	 the	 reflexive	approval	 I	have	described	
above.6
6.	 Ginsborg	 recognizes	 this	 implication	of	her	view	and	accepts	 it:	according	
to	 her,	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 imagination	 and	 understanding	 harmonizing	
“freely”	contradicts	Kant’s	description	of	their	roles	in	cognition	in	the	Critique 
of Pure Reason	(Ginsborg,	“On	the	Key”,	46,	50).	I	do	not	agree	with	this	criti-
cism,	but	I	will	not	attempt	to	respond	to	it	here.	It	should	be	sufficient	for	our	
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Kant	 clearly	distinguishes	 the	 subject’s	awareness	of	 the	harmony	of	
her	faculties	from	the	pleasure	that	accompanies	this	awareness:
[A]n	 aesthetic	 judgment	 is	 that	 whose	 determining	
ground	lies	in	a	sensation	[Empfindung]	that	is	immediate-
ly connected with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure	 [mit 
dem Gefühle der Lust und Unlust unmittelbar verbunden ist].	
…	In	the	aesthetic	 judgment	of	sense	[i.e.,	 judgments	of	
the	agreeable]	 it	 is	 that	sensation	which	 is	 immediately	
produced	by	the	empirical	intuition	of	the	object,	in	the	
aesthetic	judgment	of	reflection	[i.e.,	judgments	of	beau-
ty]	…	 it	 is	 that sensation which the harmonious play of the 
two faculties of cognition in the power of judgment, imagina-
tion and understanding, produces	in	the	subject	insofar	as	in	
the	given	representation	the	faculty	of	the	apprehension	
of	the	one	and	the	faculty	of	presentation	of	the	other	are	
reciprocally	 expeditious,	 which	 relation	 in	 such	 a	 case	
produces	through	this	mere	form	a sensation that is the de-
termining ground of a judgment which	for that reason is called 
aesthetic	and	as	subjective	purposiveness	(without	a	con-
cept)	is	combined with	the	feeling	of	pleasure	(20:224,	my	
emphases).
In	this	passage,	Kant	clearly	distinguishes	two	elements:	the	sensation 
of the harmonious play	of	the	faculties	—	which	he	identifies	as	the	de-
termining	ground	of	the	judgment	of	beauty	—	and	the	 feeling of plea-
sure,	which	he	says	is	combined	with	it.	
In	fact,	Kant	suggests	in	this	passage	(and	again	at	20:22610)	that	it	
10.	 “The	merely	reflecting	power	of	judgment	…	relates	reflection	immediately	
only	to	sensation	[Empfindung],	which,	like	all	sensations,	is	always	accompa-
nied with	pleasure	or	displeasure	[mit Lust oder Unlust begleitet ist]	…”	(20:226,	
my	emphases).	Now,	these	passages	do	not	reappear	in	the	published	Intro-
duction.	But	I	do	not	think	we	need	to	read	this	as	meaning	that	Kant	changed	
his	mind	about	the	structure	of	aesthetic	judgment	in	the	published	Critique.	
For	one,	the	First	Introduction	contains	a	number	of	claims	that	do	not	reap-
pear	in	the	(shorter)	published	Introduction	but	have	nevertheless	been	in-
valuable	for	understanding	the	details	of	Kant’s	published	account.	Moreover,	
example,	he	says:	“The	judgment	[of	beauty]	 is	also	called	aesthetic	
precisely	because	its	determining	ground	is	not	a	concept	but	the	feel-
ing	(of	inner	sense)	[das Gefühl (des innern Sinnes)]	of	that	unison	in	the	
play	of	the	powers	of	the	mind,	insofar	as	they	can	only	be	sensed.”8 
Now,	despite	their	other	differences,	most	commentators	assume	that	
“the	feeling	…	of	that	unison”	of	the	faculties	just	is	the	feeling	of	plea-
sure	in	the	beautiful.9	They	assume,	in	other	words,	that	the	harmony	
of	the	faculties	is	manifest	to	the	subject	through	a	feeling	of	pleasure.
Reading	this	commitment	into	§9	gives	rise	to	the	puzzle	that	is	the	
topic	of	this	paper.	For	after	denying	there	that	pleasure	in	the	beauti-
ful	precedes	the	judgment	of	beauty,	Kant	continues:
[S]	Thus	 it	 is	 the	universal	 communicability	of	 the state 
of mind	in	the	given	representation	which,	as	the	subjec-
tive	condition	of	the	judgment	of	taste,	must	serve	as	its 
ground	and	have	the pleasure in the object as a consequence 
(5:217,	my	emphases).
The	problem	posed	by	sentence	[S]	is	as	follows:	if	the	“state	of	mind”	
that	is	referred	to	in	this	sentence	as	the	determining ground	of	the	judg-
ment	of	beauty	is	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	and	is	itself	pleasurable	
(F→J),	how	can	Kant	go	on	to	suggest	that	the	feeling	of	pleasure	oc-
curs	only	as	a	consequence	of	the	judgment	(J→F)?
I	want	to	argue	here	that	Kant	does not	in	fact	identify	the	feeling	of	
the	harmony	of	the	faculties	with	the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	beauti-
ful.	In	the	following	passage	from	the	First	Introduction,	for	example,	
8.	 Kant	also	refers	to	“a	feeling	of	the	free	play	of	the	powers	of	representation”	
in	§9	itself	(5:217).
9.	 This	 is	 true	on	both	Guyer’s	and	Ginsborg’s	views,	as	 I	have	discussed.	Al-
lison	is	also	explicitly	committed	to	this	claim,	as	mentioned	in	n.	7.	So,	for	
example,	are	Béatrice	Longuenesse	(whose	view	I	contrast	with	my	own	in	n.	
15),	Linda	Palmer	(“A	Universality	Not	Based”,	26;	29;	36)	and	Melissa	Zinkin	
(“Pleasure	of	‘Mere	Reflection’”,	437).	Zuckert	notes	that	Kant	does	not	in	fact	
identify	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	as	pleasure,	but	concludes	
that	“it	seems	likely	…	that	it	is”	(Zuckert,	Beauty and Biology,	313n47).
	 janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful
philosophers’	imprint	 –		6		–	 vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019)
…	 in	 what	 way	 do	 we	 become	 conscious	 of	 a	 mutual	
subjective	 correspondence	 of	 the	 powers	 of	 cognition	
with	each	other	 in	 the	 judgment	of	 taste	—	aesthetically,	
through	 mere	 inner	 sense	 and	 sensation,	 or	 intellectu-
ally,	through	the	consciousness	of	our	intentional	activity	
through	which	we	set	them	in	play?	(5:218)
He	answers	that	the	harmonious	relation	between	the	faculties	“can	
make	itself	known	only	through	sensation	[Empfindung]”	(5:219),	and	
adds:
The	animation	of	both	faculties	(the	imagination	and	the	
understanding)	 to	 an	 activity	 that	 is	 indeterminate	 but	
yet,	through	the	stimulus	of	the	given	representation,	in	
unison,	namely	that	which	belongs	to	a	cognition	in	gen-
eral,	 is the sensation whose	universal	communicability	 is	
postulated	by	the	judgment	of	taste	(5:219,	my	emphasis).
The	implication	is	clear.	Recall	once	again	that	in	sentence	[S],	Kant	
claims	that	it	is	the	“universal	communicability	of	the	state	of	mind”	in	
representing	the	beautiful	object	that	grounds	the	judgment	of	beauty	
and	has	the	pleasure	as	its	consequence.	In	the	passage	above,	he	says	
that	the	judgment	of	beauty	“postulates”	—	that	is,	is	made	on	the	basis	
of	—	the	universal	communicability	of	the	sensation	of	the	harmony	of	
the	faculties.	If	the	sensation	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	distinct	
from	the	feeling	of	pleasure,	as	I	have	suggested,	this	is	all	perfectly	
consistent.	
My	proposal,	then,	is	as	follows:	We	can	solve	the	puzzle	of	§9	once	
we	allow	that,	for	Kant,	there	are	two	distinct	feelings	involved	in	an	
aesthetic	judgment	of	the	beautiful.	The	first	is	the	feeling	of	the	har-
mony	of	the	faculties,	which	is	the	aesthetic	determining	ground	of	the	
judgment	of	beauty	(F1→J).	The	second	is	the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	
beautiful,	which	is	its	consequence	(J→F2).
12
12.	 Guyer	 briefly	 considers	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 interpretation	 like	 mine,	 al-
though	without	noting	the	passages	I	cite	here	in	support	of	it	(Guyer,	Claims 
of Taste,	 90).	He	 immediately	 rules	 it	 out,	 however,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	
is	the	case	for	aesthetic	judgments	in general	—	both	judgments	of	the	
agreeable,	 which	 report	 one’s	 merely	 subjective	 pleasure	 in	 an	 ob-
ject,	as	well	as	judgments	of	beauty	—	that	the	pleasure	they	involve	
is	combined	with	and	grounded	in	a	sensation	that	is	distinct	from	the	
pleasure	itself. In	the	case	of	judgments	of	the	agreeable,	Kant	identi-
fies	the	relevant	sensation(s)	as	the	one(s)	produced	by	intuiting	the	
object	—	the	 taste	 sensations,	 for	example,	caused	by	eating	a	choco-
late	that	gives	one	pleasure.11	 In	the	case	of	judgments	of	beauty,	he	
says,	the	relevant	sensation	that	gives	rise	to	pleasure	is	the	sensation	
of	the	harmony	of	one’s	faculties.	This	indicates,	however,	that	just	as	
taste	sensations	are	distinct	from	and	give	rise	to	the	pleasure	in	eating	
chocolate,	so	the	sensation	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	distinct	
from	and	gives	rise	to	the	pleasure	in	the	beautiful.
Reading	a	distinction	between	the	sensation	of	harmony	and	the	
feeling	of	pleasure	back	into	§9,	we	can	see	that	there	Kant	explicitly	
identifies	“the	state	of	mind	in	the	given	representation”	—	which,	in	
sentence	 [S]	above,	was	meant	 to	be	 the	ground	of	 the	 judgment	of	
beauty	and	have	the	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	as	a	consequence	—	as	the	
“feeling	of	the	free	play	of	the	powers	of	representation”	(5:217).	If	the	
feeling	of	harmony	and	the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	are	two	
distinct	feelings,	as	suggested	in	the	passage	above,	there	is	no	longer	
any	problem	in	reading	[S]	literally:	once	disambiguated,	it	says	sim-
ply	that	the	feeling	of	harmony	must	be	the	ground	of	the	judgment	of	
beauty	and	have	the	feeling	of	pleasure	as	its	consequence.
In	fact,	towards	the	end	of	§9,	Kant	explicitly	raises	and	responds	
to	the	question	of	how	we	come	to	be	aware	of	the	harmony	of	the	
faculties	when	making	a	judgment	of	beauty.	Here	is	how	he	puts	the	
question:
as	we	have	seen,	Kant	 returns	 to	specifying	 the	structure	of	aesthetic	 judg-
ment	in	§9	of	the	body	of	the	Critique of Judgment,	and	his	comments	there	
seem	 to	 require	 and	 confirm	 the	 view	expressed	by	 these	passages	 in	 the	
First	Introduction.
11.	 See	also	A29	in	the	Critique of Pure Reason,	where	Kant	says	that	a	“pleasant	
taste”	[Wohlgeschmack]	is	grounded	in	“a	feeling	(of	pleasure	and	displeasure)	
as	an	effect	of	the	sensation	[of	taste]”.	
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pleasure	and	displeasure?	I	address	this	worry	in	§2.4;	for	now,	I	return	
to	completing	the	discussion	of	my	proposal.
I	have	been	arguing	 that	 the	 feeling	of	harmony	and	 the	 feeling	
of	pleasure	are	distinct	feelings	for	Kant.	Distinguishing	them,	I	think,	
also	helps	to	clarify	another	aspect	of	 the	opening	paragraphs	of	§9.	
As	 I	mentioned,	Kant	begins	 the	section	by	arguing	that	pleasure	 in	
the	beautiful	could	not	precede	the	judgment	of	beauty.	If	 this	were	
the	case,	he	explains,	the	subject’s	basis	for	judgment	would	consist	
in	the	immediate	sensory	pleasantness	of	the	judged	object:	the	kind	
of	pleasure	she	might	take	in	a	piece	of	chocolate,	say,	that	she	finds	
tasty.	But	a	judgment	that	a	piece	of	chocolate	is	tasty	has,	according	to	
Kant,	“merely	private	validity”:	that	is,	it	expresses	a	merely	subjective	
preference.	For	the	empirical	fact	that	she	feels	immediate	pleasure	in	
the	chocolate	does	not	give	the	subject	any	grounds	 for	demanding	
that	others	do	so	as	well.
In	contrast,	as	 I	have	already	emphasized,	Kant	 takes	 it	 to	be	cri-
terial	of	a	judgment	of	beauty	that	it	has	“universal	validity”:	it	does	
not	express	a	merely	subjective	preference	for	the	beautiful	object,	but	
rather	claims	that	everyone	ought	to	find	it	beautiful.	Kant’s	point	in	
§9,	I	want	to	suggest,	is	that	such	a	claim	cannot	be	legitimate	if	the	
basis	for	the	subject’s	judgment	of	beauty	in any way	involves	her	feel-
ings	of	pleasure.	For	in	the	latter	case,	her	grounds	would	involve	the	
immediate	pleasantness	of	a	sensation,	rather	than	its	universal	com-
municability.14	Any	interpretation	that	makes	the	determining	ground	
of	judgments	of	beauty	a	state	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	that	is	
14.	 Kant	expresses	a	similar	point	in	the	case	of	the	pleasure	or	displeasure	that	
accompanies	the	representation	of	a	possible	action	in	the	Metaphysics of Mor-
als.	He	distinguishes	there	between	a	pleasure	that	“precedes	[vorhergeht]	the	
representation	of	the	[moral]	law”,	which	he	characterizes	as	“pathological”,	
and	the	pleasure	 that	 “can	only	 follow”	 from	recognition	of	 the	 law,	which	
alone	counts	as	genuinely	moral	(6:399).	As	I	see	it,	Kant	makes	the	parallel	
point	in	§9	that	any	pleasure	that	precedes	a	judgment	of	beauty	could	only	
be	“pathological”	—	that	is,	a	merely	contingent,	psychological	response	to	an	
object	akin	to	pleasure	in	the	agreeable	—	whereas	genuine	pleasure	in	the	
beautiful	must	follow	upon	a	judgment	of	beauty.
Let	 me	 pause	 to	 clarify	 an	 important	 terminological	 point	 here.	
Kant	moves	between	referring	to	the	feeling	of	harmony	as	a	sensation 
[Empfindung]	 and	 as	 a	 feeling [Gefühl],	without	 apparently	 intending	
any	difference	in	meaning.	The	same	is	true	for	pleasure,	which	he	re-
fers	to	as	a	sensation	(e.g.	20:229;	5:204),	as	well	as	(more	frequently)	
a	feeling.	In	§3	of	the	Analytic	of	the	Beautiful,	Kant	says	that,	in	order	
to	avoid	confusion,	he	intends	to	reserve	the	term	‘feeling’	for	a	sensa-
tion	that	 “must	always	remain	merely	subjective	and	absolutely	can-
not	constitute	a	representation	of	an	object”	(5:206).	In	other	words,	
the	term	‘feeling’,	for	Kant,	designates	a	type	of	sensation	in	virtue	of	
which	a	subject	is	made	aware	of	a	merely	subjective	state	of	herself	
rather	 than	of	 a	property	 that	 can	be	ascribed	 to	an	object.	Thus,	 a	
sensation	 of	 greenness,	 for	 example,	 counts	 as	 an	 “objective	 sensa-
tion”	since	it	affords	the	subject	awareness	of	a	property	she	ascribes	
to	 objects	 she	 cognizes	 as	 green;	 in	 contrast,	 the	 sensation	 of	 plea-
sure	 is	a	 “subjective	sensation”	or	 feeling,	 through	which	 the	subject	
becomes	aware	merely	of	her	own	state,	rather	than	of	a	property	she	
can	ascribe	to	objects.13	Now,	since	the	sensation	of	the	harmony	of	
the	faculties	is	a	sensation	by	which	the	subject	becomes	aware	of	the	
state	of	her	own	cognitive	faculties	rather	than	a	property	of	objects,	
it	properly	counts	as	a	 feeling	by	Kant’s	definition.	 I	 refer	 to	 it	here	
as	a	sensation	when	Kant’s	text	does	so,	and	as	a	feeling	on	all	other	
occasions.	I	choose	the	latter	by	default	because	it	brings	out	the	aes-
thetic	character	of	the	judgment	of	beauty	(which	Kant	emphasizes,	for	
example,	in	the	passage	quoted	above	from	5:228).	My	doing	so	may	
give	rise	to	a	worry,	however:	Does	Kant	allow	for	any	feelings	besides	
appears	to	conflict	with	Kant’s	claim	in	§12	that	consciousness	of	the	“subjec-
tive	purposiveness”	of	a	beautiful	object	is	identical	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure	
itself.	I	address	this	in	§2.3,	where	I	argue	that	the	latter	claim	is	compatible	
with	the	interpretation	I	defend	in	this	paper.
13.	 Kant	 also	 characterizes	 feelings	 this	 way	 in	 the	 Prolegomena,	 where	 he	 re-
fers	to	the	warmth	of	a	room,	the	sweetness	of	sugar	and	the	repugnance	of	
wormwood	as	feelings	which	“are	merely	subjective	and	which	must	therefore	
never	be	attributed	to	the	object”	(4:299n).	
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between	her	faculties.	She	then	reflects	on	this	relation,	comparing	it	
with	the	relation	that	is	a	condition	on	judgment	in	general.17	This	re-
flection	issues	in	the	judgment	of	beauty,18	in	which	the	subject	claims	
that	the	harmonious	state	of	her	faculties	in	representing	the	beautiful	
object	 is	universally	valid	—	that	 is,	 that	 anyone	who	 represents	 the	
object	ought	to	share	that	state	(I	will	have	more	to	say	about	what	is	
meant	to	ground	this	claim	in	§3).	This	judgment	is	accompanied	by	
the	feeling	of	pleasure.19	In	sum,	the	judgment	as	a	whole	has	the	fol-
lowing	structure:	Feeling	of	harmony	→ Reflecting	judgment	→ Feel-
ing	of	pleasure.
In	the	remainder	of	 this	section,	 I	work	out	 further	details	of	 the	
account	I	am	proposing	by	responding	to	a	number	of	potential	ques-
tions	 and	 objections.	 In	 §2.2,	 I	 relate	 the	 universal	 validity	 of	 the	
harmony	of	 the	 faculties	 to	 the	universal	 validity	of	pleasure	 in	 the	
beautiful.	In	§2.3,	I	respond	to	the	objection	that	my	view	is	ruled	out	
by	passages	in	which	Kant	identifies	consciousness	of	the	“subjective	
17.	 Kant’s	 claim	 that	experiences	of	beauty	 involve	 this	kind	of	 reflection	may	
seem	to	grossly	over-intellectualize	them,	since	it	seems	to	require	that	a	sub-
ject	have	knowledge	of	the	conditions	of	judgment	in	order	merely	to	find	an	
object	beautiful.	We	can	go	some	way	towards	mitigating	this	concern	by	not-
ing	that	the	subject	need	only	judge	something	to	the	effect	that	her	faculties	
are	working well	as	she	represents	the	beautiful	object.
18.	 I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	here	that	 there	are	 two	acts	of	 judging	—	the	first,	
reflection;	the	second,	the	judgment	of	beauty	—	as	on	Guyer’s	view.	Rather,	
there	is	only	one	activity	of	reflective	comparison	that	culminates	in	a	judg-
ment	of	beauty.	This	is	exactly	parallel	to	determining	judgments,	in	which	
an	activity	carried	out	 in	accordance	with	conceptual	rules	culminates	 in	a	
determining	judgment	that	subsumes	the	object	under	a	concept.
19.	 It	should	be	granted	that	at	times	Kant	seems	to	suggest	that	the	judgment	
of	beauty	is	phenomenologically	manifest	as	—	and	so,	identical	to	—	the	feel-
ing	of	pleasure,	as	Ginsborg	suggests.	(I	discuss	some	of	 these	passages	 in	
§§2.3	and	2.4	below.)	So	far,	I	have	treated	the	two	as	distinct	for	the	sake	of	
simplicity	and	clarity,	but	my	view	is	compatible	with	either	possibility.	If	the	
judgment	of	beauty	 is	 identical	 to	 the	 feeling	of	pleasure,	 then	rather	 than	
the	feeling	of	harmony	giving	rise	to	both	the	pleasure	and	the	judgment,	as	
I	have	been	claiming,	it	would	ground	a	single	state	of	pleasurable	judgment.	
Importantly,	however,	this	single	state	of	pleasurable	judgment	would	not	it-
self	exhaust	the	experience	of	beauty,	as	on	Ginsborg’s	view,	but	would	rather	
be	made	on	the	basis	of	the	independent	awareness	of	the	harmonious	state	
of	one’s	faculties.
itself	pleasurable,	 I	want	 to	argue,	 runs	afoul	of	 this	point.15	On	my	
view,	in	contrast,	the	feeling	of	harmony	is	not	itself	pleasurable,	but	
is	rather	the	ground	of	both	the	judgment	of	beauty	and	the	pleasure	
in	the	beautiful.16	Unlike	feelings	of	pleasure,	the	feeling	of	harmony	is	
an	awareness	of	the	state	of	the	subject’s	cognitive	faculties	that	—	as	I	
will	explain	in	§3	—	does	give	the	subject	grounds	to	demand	that	oth-
ers	agree	with	her	judgment	of	beauty.
Armed	with	 the	distinction	between	 the	 feeling	of	harmony	and	
the	feeling	of	pleasure,	I	can	now	fully	specify	what	I	take	the	structure	
of	Kant’s	judgments	of	beauty	to	be.	Of	relevance	here	is	the	fact	that	
Kant	characterizes	such	judgments	as	“reflecting”	judgments	—	on	his	
view,	they	involve	an	act	of	reflection	in	which	the	subject	compares	the	
relation	her	faculties	are	brought	into	by	a	given	representation	with	
the	 relation	 they	must	be	 in	 for	 judgment	 in	general	 to	be	possible	
(20:220;	see	also	20:211).	Bearing	this	in	mind,	I	argue	that,	for	Kant,	
judgments	 of	 beauty	 involve	 the	 following	 stages:	 When	 the	 sub-
ject	perceives	a	beautiful	object,	she	senses	the	harmonious	relation	
15.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 on	 the	 interpretations	 defended	 by	 Guyer,	 Ginsborg	 and	
Allison.	It	is	also	an	important	difference	between	my	account	and	the	one	
suggested	by	Béatrice	Longuenesse	in	“Kant’s	Leading	Thread”.	Longuenesse	
suggests	 that	 the	 pleasure	 in	 the	 beautiful	 is	 a	 “two-fold”	 pleasure:	 a	 first-
order	pleasure	in	the	harmony	of	the	faculties,	combined	with	a	second-order	
pleasure	in	the	universal	validity	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	(207–9).	My	
account	 resembles	 Longuenesse’s	 insofar	 as	we	both	 identify	 two	 feelings	
in	the	beautiful.	A	crucial	difference,	however,	is	that,	according	to	me,	the	
feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	a	sui generis	feeling	that	is	not	itself	
pleasurable.	This	 is	 important,	 I	 think,	because	it	respects	Kant’s	 insistence	
in	§9	that	a	judgment	made	on	the	basis	of	pleasure	could	have	only	subjec-
tive	validity.	On	whether	Kant	allows	for	feelings	distinct	from	pleasure	and	
displeasure,	 see	§2.4	below.	That	 the	harmony	of	 the	 faculties	 is	not	 itself	
pleasurable	will	also	be	key	for	the	solution	to	the	problem	for	Kant’s	deduc-
tion	that	I	go	on	to	offer	in	§3.
16.	 Admittedly,	Kant	 refers	 to	pleasure	as	 the	determining	ground	of	 the	 judg-
ment	of	beauty	on	at	least	two	occasions	(20:225,	5:191).	In	this	paper,	how-
ever,	I	proceed	on	the	assumption	that	his	most	careful	statement	of	the	struc-
ture	of	judgments	of	beauty	is	presented	in	§9,	where,	as	we	have	seen,	he	
explicitly	asks	whether	pleasure	precedes	the	judgment	of	beauty	and	argues	
unequivocally	that	it	cannot	do	so.	As	such,	I	think	we	cannot	take	those	pas-
sages	where	he	nevertheless	refers	 to	pleasure	as	a	determining	ground	at	
face	value.
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The	subjective	universal	communicability	of	the	kind	of	
representation	in	a	judgment	of	taste	…	can	be	nothing	
other	than	the state of mind in the free play of the imagination 
and the understanding	(so	far	as	they	agree	with	each	other	
as	is	requisite	for	a	cognition	in	general):	for	we	are	con-
scious	that	this	subjective	relation	suited	to	cognition	in	
general	must	be	valid	for	everyone	and	consequently	uni-
versally	 communicable	….	 Now,	 this	merely	 subjective	
(aesthetic)	judging	of	the	object,	or	of	the	representation	
through	which	the	object	is	given,	precedes the pleasure in 
it, and is the ground of this pleasure … but on that universal-
ity of the subjective conditions of the judging of objects alone is 
this universal subjective validity of satisfaction, which we com-
bine with the representation of the object that we call beautiful, 
grounded	(5:217–8,	my	emphases).
2.3 “Subjective Purposiveness” and Pleasure
I	also	need	to	address	what	may	seem	to	be	a	significant	textual	ob-
stacle	to	my	view:	the	fact	that	it	appears	inconsistent	with	passages	
in	 which	 Kant	 says	 alternatively	 that	 the	 “representation”	 (20:228,	
20:248),	the	“consciousness”	(5:222)	or	even	the	“concept”	(20:230)	of	
the	 “subjective	 purposiveness”	 of	 a	 beautiful	 object	 is	 identical	with	
the	feeling	of	pleasure.	Since	what	it	means	for	an	object	to	be	“subjec-
tively	purposive”	is	just	for	it	to	be	such	that	representing	it	puts	one’s	
cognitive	faculties	into	harmony,	it	is	not	unreasonable	to	assume	that	
“consciousness	of	 the	 subjective	purposiveness”	 is	nothing	over	and	
above	the	feeling	of	harmony.	And	since	Kant	claims	that	the	former	is	
identical	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure,	it	would	follow	that	so	is	the	latter.	
But	this	would	spell	trouble	for	my	view,	since	it	turns	precisely	on	de-
nying	that	the	feeling	of	harmony	is	identical	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure.
Let	me	schematize	the	worry	before	responding	to	it.	In	what	fol-
lows,	SP	refers	to	consciousness	of	the	subjective	purposiveness	of	an	
purposiveness”	of	 a	beautiful	object	with	 the	 feeling	of	pleasure.	 In	
§2.4,	 I	discuss	the	worry	that	Kant	does	not	make	room	for	any	feel-
ings	besides	pleasure	and	displeasure.	Finally,	 in	§2.5,	 I	make	 some	
comments	about	the	relation	between	the	feeling	of	harmony	and	the	
feeling	of	pleasure.
2.2 The Universal Validity of Pleasure
Kant	makes	clear	that,	on	his	view,	the	judgment	of	beauty	claims	the	
universal	validity	not	only	of	the	feeling	of	harmony,	but	of	the	feeling	
of	pleasure	itself.	In	§11,	for	example,	he	says:
the	relation	of	the	powers	of	representation	to	each	other	
insofar	as	they	are	determined	by	a	representation	…	is	
combined	with	the	feeling	of	pleasure	that	is	at	the	same	
time	declared	to	be	valid	for	everyone	through	the	judg-
ment	of	taste	(5:221).
Since	I	follow	Kant	in	claiming	that	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	is	only	a	
consequence	of	the	judgment	of	beauty,	can	my	view	accommodate	the	
claim	that	the	judgment	itself	“declare[s]”	the	universal	validity	of	the	
pleasure?	I	think	it	can.	As	we	have	seen,	Kant	says	that	the	judgment	
of	beauty	claims	that	the	feeling	of	harmony	produced	by	a	beautiful	
object	is	universally	communicable.	It	claims,	that	is,	that	the	state	of	
the	subject’s	faculties	in	representing	the	beautiful	object	—	one	of	mu-
tual	agreement	between	the	imagination	and	the	understanding	—	is	
one	that	any	subject	appraising	that	object	can	and	ought	to	share.
Now,	so	long	as	the	pleasure	felt	 in	the	beautiful	object	 is	a	plea-
sure	in	the	feeling	of	harmony	that	is	claimed	to	be	universally	valid,	
it	follows,	for	Kant,	that	it	is	itself	universally	valid.	As	such,	it	can	be	
said	that	the	judgment	of	beauty	claims	the	universal	validity	of	the	
feeling	of	harmony	and	at the same time	and	on that basis	establishes	the	
universal	validity	of	the	subject’s	pleasure	in	the	harmony.	This	is	just	
what	we	see	Kant	say	in	§9:
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of	the	state	of	her	own	faculties;	when	she	represents	subjective	pur-
posiveness,	on	 the	other	hand,	she	goes	beyond	this	and	ascribes	a	
(subjective)	property	to	the	object	she	judges	beautiful.20	Whereas	the	
former	gives	one	grounds	for	a	judgment	of	beauty,	the	latter	—	as	Kant	
makes	clear	in	the	Third	Moment	(5:236)	—	is	part	of	the	content	of	the	
judgment	itself.21	If	this	is	right,	consciousness	of	subjective	purposive-
ness	is	not	identical	with	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	one’s	faculties:	
assumption	(2)	that	underpins	the	objection	should	be	rejected.
When	Kant	claims,	then,	that	the	consciousness,	or	representation,	
of	 the	 subjective	 purposiveness	 of	 an	 object	 is	 even	 identical	 with	
pleasure,	I	suggest	we	read	him	as	saying	that	the	judgment	of	beauty	
itself	can	be	said	to	be	expressed	through	pleasure.22	His	point	in	these	
passages,	in	other	words,	is	that	in	feeling	a	pleasure	that	she	takes	to	
be	universally	valid,	the	subject	in	effect	expresses	her	judgment	that	
the	object	is	beautiful	or,	equivalently,	subjectively	purposive.	This	is	
precisely	what	he	says	at	5:189:	“pleasure	can	express	nothing	but	[the	
object’s]	suitability	to	the	cognitive	faculties	that	are	in	play	in	the	re-
flecting	power	of	judgment,	insofar	as	they	are	in	play,	and	thus	merely	
a	subjective	formal	purposiveness	of	the	object”	(my	emphasis).	This	
is	compatible	with	the	ground	for	the	judgment	of	purposiveness	being	
an	independent	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	that	is	not	itself	
pleasurable:	as	is	the	case	on	my	view.
20.	At	5:222,	Kant	also	allows	the	ascription	of	subjective	purposiveness	to	“the	
play	of	 the	cognitive	powers	of	 the	subject	 in	 the	case	of	a	 representation	
through	which	an	object	is	given”.	I	do	not	take	his	meaning	here	to	be	signifi-
cantly	different,	however,	from	the	passages	in	which	he	speaks	of	ascribing	
subjective	purposiveness	directly	to	the	beautiful	object.	In	either	case,	I	take	
him	to	be	referring	to	a	judgment	that	the	object	(or	its	representation)	gives	
rise	to	the	harmonious	free	play	of	the	faculties.	My	suggestion	here	is	that	
making	such	a	judgment	goes	beyond	merely	feeling	that	harmony.
21.	 Zuckert	makes	a	 similar	point	against	Guyer’s	understanding	of	purposive-
ness	(Zuckert,	Beauty and Biology,	332n19).
22.	 This	fits	well	with	passages	in	which	Kant	claims	that	pleasure	functions	as	
the	“predicate”	 in	a	 judgment	of	beauty	(5:191;	5:288;	5:289).	On	this	point,	
see	Aquila	(“A	New	Look”)	and	Rind	(“What	Is	Claimed”,	83–4).	I	return	to	
this	point	in	§2.4	below.
object,	HF	to	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties,	and	PL	to	the	
feeling	of	pleasure.
Objection:
(1)	SP = PL.	[20:228,	230,	248,	5:222]
(2)	SP = HF.	[By	assumption]
(3)	⇒ HF = PL
To	begin	to	respond	to	the	objection,	 let	me	note	that	endorsing	(3)	
commits	 Kant	 to	 an	 explicit	 inconsistency.	 For,	 as	 we	 have	 already	
seen,	he	also	clearly	asserts	both	(4)	and	(5):
(4)	HF	is	the	determining	ground	of	a	judgment	of	beauty.	
[e.g.	5:228]
(5)	PL	cannot	be	the	determining	ground	of	a	judgment	of	
beauty,	but	rather	must	be	its	consequence.	[5:217]
Together,	these	entail:
(6)	HF ≠	PL.
As	I	have	argued	so	far,	the	fact	that	Kant	endorses	and	argumentative-
ly	defends	(4)	and	(5)	in	response	to	the	“key”	question	of	§9	strongly	
indicates	 that	he	 is	 indeed	committed	to	(6).	The	only	way	to	avoid	
saddling	his	view	with	 incoherence,	 then,	 is	 to	 resist	 (3).	 I	will	now	
suggest	that	the	correct	way	of	doing	so	is	to	deny	(2):	that	is,	to	reject	
the	assumption	that	consciousness	of	subjective	purposiveness	(SP)	is	
identical	with	the	feeling	of	harmony	(HF).
To	 begin	 with,	 note	 that	 in	 the	 passages	 cited	 by	 the	 objection,	
“subjective	purposiveness”	is	primarily	ascribed	to	the	beautiful	object.	
At	 20:228,	 for	 example,	Kant	 says	 that	 it	 is	 “the	 representation	 of	 a	
subjective	purposiveness	of	an	object”	that	is	“even	identical	with	the	
feeling	of	pleasure”.	To	represent	an	object	as	subjectively	purposive,	
however,	is	plausibly	to	do	more	than	merely	feel	the	harmony	of	the	
faculties.	Through	the	feeling	of	harmony,	the	subject	becomes	aware	
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pleasure	and	displeasure.	For	one,	as	I	noted	above,	he	there	charac-
terizes	 sensations	of	warmth	and	 sweetness	as	 feelings,	 precisely	on	
the	grounds	that	these	sensations	“are	merely	subjective	and	…	must	
therefore	never	be	attributed	to	the	object”	(4:299n).	Now,	Kant	is	not	
always	consistent	in	whether	he	considers	sensations	that	correspond	
to	secondary	qualities	to	be	subjective	or	objective.23	Regardless,	the	
important	point	for	my	purposes	here	is	that	his	usage	in	the	Prolegom-
ena — where	he	employs	the	same	definition	of	‘feeling’	that	he	does	
in	the	Critique of Judgment — suggests	that	he	does	not	operate	with	an	
understanding	of	the	term	that	in	principle	only	picks	out	determina-
tions	of	pleasure	or	displeasure.	
In	fact,	there	is	yet	another	instance	in	the	Prolegomena where	Kant	
uses	the	term	‘feeling’	to	characterize	a	subject’s	awareness	of	herself	
that	 does	 not	 obviously	 involve	 any	 pleasure	 or	 displeasure.	 In	 the	
context	of	a	discussion	of	self-consciousness,	he	says	that	a	subject’s	
awareness	of	herself	in	apperception	does	not	amount	to	awareness	of	
the	properties	of	an	object,	but	rather	expresses	merely	a	“feeling	of	an	
existence”	[Gefühl eines Daseins]	(4:334n,	my	emphasis).	Now,	as	Kant	
emphasizes	in	the	Critique of Pure Reason,	a	subject’s	awareness	of	her-
self	in	apperception	consists	in	awareness	of	her	own	activity	of	think-
ing,	rather	than	of	any	property	that	she	can	ascribe	to	an	object	(even	
to	herself	as	an	object).24	This	explains	why	Kant	would	characterize	
such	awareness	as	a	feeling:	since	it	consists	in	awareness	of	the	sub-
ject	rather	than	of	any	property	of	an	object,	it	satisfies	the	definition	
of	 feeling	discussed	above.	But	there	is	no	reason	to	think	that	 it	 in-
volves	any	feelings	of	pleasure	or	displeasure;	indeed	this	would	be	very	
far	from	Kant’s	description	of	what	a	subject’s	awareness	of	herself	in	
23.	 In	the	Critique of Pure Reason,	for	example,	Kant	suggests	that	colors,	tastes,	etc.	
are	subjective	sensations	that	“do	not	allow	any	object	to	be	cognized”	(A29/
B44).	However,	in	§3	of	the	Critique of Judgment,	as	we	have	seen,	he	calls	the	
sensation	of	greenness	an	objective	sensation,	on	the	grounds	that	 it	consti-
tutes	“perception	of	an	object”	(5:206).
24.	 See	Critique of Pure Reason,	A402,	B406–7,	B429–30.
2.4 Feelings Other than Pleasure and Displeasure
I	have	been	arguing	that,	for	Kant,	the	feeling	of	harmony	is	a	sui ge-
neris	feeling,	distinct	from	the	feeling	of	pleasure	and	displeasure.	This	
brings	with	it	a	worry,	however:	Does	Kant	allow	for	any	feelings	dis-
tinct	from	pleasure	and	displeasure?	It	may	appear	that	he	rules	out	
this	possibility	in	the	First	Introduction,	where	he	says	that	“there	is	
only	one	so-called	sensation	that	can	never	become	a	concept	of	an	
object,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 feeling	of	 pleasure	 and	displeasure”	 (20:224).	
This	admittedly	puts	pressure	on	my	claim	that	the	feeling	of	harmony	
is	a	distinct	sensation	that	pertains	merely	to	the	state	of	the	subject	
rather	than	to	objects.	
Let	me	begin	by	noting	some	factors	that	I	think	mitigate	the	worry.	
As	I	have	already	discussed,	Kant	defines	a	feeling	as	any	sensation	by	
which	the	subject	becomes	aware	of	her	own	subjective	state,	rather	
than	of	properties	she	can	ascribe	to	objects.	His	definitions	of	pleasure 
and	displeasure	in	§10	of	the	Critique of Judgment,	on	the	other	hand,	are	
narrower:
The	 consciousness	 of	 the	 causality	 of	 a	 representation	
with	respect	to	the	state	of	the	subject,	for	maintaining	it	
in	that	state,	can	here	designate	in	general	what	is	called	
pleasure;	 in	 contrast	 to	which	 displeasure	 is	 that	 repre-
sentation	 that	 contains	 the	 ground	 for	 determining	 the	
state	 of	 the	 representations	 to	 their	 own	 opposite	 (hin-
dering	or	getting	rid	of	them) (5:220).
To	claim	that	pleasure	and	displeasure	are	the	only	possible	feelings,	
then,	would	be	 to	 claim	 that	 the	only	 state	of	herself	 that	 a	 subject	
can	be	aware	of	that	does	not	amount	to	awareness	of	the	properties	
of	a	cognized	object	is	a	state	that	either	tends	to	maintain	the	repre-
sentational	state	the	subject	 is	 in	(i.e.,	pleasure),	or	tends	to	prompt	
her	 to	 change	 the	 representational	 state	 she	 is	 in	 (i.e.,	 displeasure).	
But	 does	 Kant	 really	 think	 that	 this	 is	 the	 only	 possible	 subjective	
state	one	can	be	aware	of?	There	 is	evidence	 that	at	 least	as	 late	as	
the	Prolegomena,	 Kant	 is	willing	 to	 countenance	 feelings	 other	 than	
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2.5 The Relation Between the Feeling of Harmony and Pleasure
Another	question	that	may	arise	for	my	proposal	is	the	nature	of	the	
relation	between	the	two	feelings	I	have	argued	it	is	necessary	to	dis-
tinguish.	Does	 the	 feeling	of	 the	harmony	of	 the	 faculties	 cause	 the	
feeling	of	pleasure?	Or	is	the	feeling	of	pleasure	intentional	—	that	is,	
about	the	feeling	of	harmony?
This	question	is	the	analogue	of	one	that	has	been	much	discussed	
in	the	secondary	literature.	Though	other	commentators	do	not	distin-
guish	the	feeling	of	harmony	from	the	feeling	of	pleasure	as	I	do,	they	
have	disagreed	about	whether	pleasure	is	merely	the	causal	effect	of	
the	faculties	being	in	harmony	or,	alternatively,	whether	it	has	inten-
tional	content	and	is	about	the	harmony	of	the	faculties.27	In	response,	
most	commentators	note	that	Kant	is	far	from	clear	on	this	issue	and,	
indeed,	 that	 textual	 support	 can	be	 found	 for	either	 reading.	A	first	
point	in	favor	of	the	causal	reading	is	Kant’s	language:	the	feeling	of	
pleasure,	he	says,	 is	 “aroused”	by	(5:190)	or	“immediately	connected	
with”	(20:224)	the	harmony	of	the	faculties.28	Even	more	significantly,	
he	appears	 to	 rule	out	 the	 intentionalist	 reading	at	5:206,	where,	as	
I	have	already	mentioned,	he	says	that	the	feeling	of	pleasure	“does	
not	serve	for	any	cognition	at	all,	not	even	that	by	which	the	subject	
cognizes	itself”.
Nevertheless,	proponents	of	the	intentionalist	reading	have	argued	
that	treating	pleasure	merely	as	an	effect	of	the	harmony	of	the	facul-
ties	turns	the	judging	of	beauty	into	an	empirical	exercise	wherein	the	
subject	attempts	to	determine	the	causal	origin	of	her	own	feeling	of	
27.	 Guyer	argues	that	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	is	merely	the	causal	effect	of	the	
harmony	of	 the	 faculties;	making	a	 judgment	of	beauty,	on	his	account,	 in-
volves	determining	whether	one’s	pleasure	in	fact	has	this	causal	origin	(Guy-
er,	Claims of Taste,	94–7;	134,	147).	Most	other	commentators,	including	Aquila	
(“A	New	Look”),	Allison	(“Pleasure	and	Harmony”;	Kant’s Theory of Taste,	53–4;	
122),	Ginsborg	(“On	the	Key”,	42–5;	96)	and	Zuckert	(“Kant’s	Theory	of	Plea-
sure”;	Beauty and Biology,	esp.	231–48)	disagree	with	Guyer	on	this	issue	and	
argue	that	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	has	intentional	content.
28.	More	precisely	(and	in	line	with	my	view),	Kant	says	that	pleasure	is	immedi-
ately	connected	with	the	sensation	of	harmony,	which	he	once	again	identifies	
as	the	determining	ground	of	the	judgment	of	beauty	(20:224).
apperception	is	like.25	This	provides	further	evidence,	then,	that	Kant	
allows	for	feelings	that	are	not	reducible	to	pleasure	or	displeasure.
How,	 then,	 should	we	understand	Kant’s	 claim	 in	 the	 First	 Intro-
duction	that	pleasure	and	displeasure	are	the	only	sensations	that	can	
never	become	 “a	 concept	 of	 an	object”?	My	 suggestion	 is	 that	Kant	
here	means	to	refer	to	the	specific	role	that	he	takes	pleasure	and	dis-
pleasure	to	play	with	respect	to	aesthetic	judgments.	As	I	mentioned	
in	§2.3	above,	Kant	sometimes	refers	to	pleasure	as	playing	the	role	
of	a	“predicate”	in	aesthetic	judgments:	in	feeling	a	pleasure	that	she	
takes	to	be	universally	valid,	he	suggests,	the	subject	in	effect	express-
es	her	judgment	that	the	object	that	gives	rise	to	the	pleasure	is	beau-
tiful.26	In	such	judgments,	Kant	indicates,	the	feeling	of	pleasure	plays	
the	role	played	by	a	concept	in	an	objective	judgment.	In	subsuming	
a	particular	object	under	the	concept	“triangle”,	for	example,	the	judg-
ment	“This	is	a	triangle”	claims	universal	validity:	it	claims,	that	is,	that	
it	is	correct	to	—	or,	equivalently,	that	any	subject	ought	to	—	apply	the	
concept	“triangle”	to	the	given	object.	Similarly,	in	feeling	a	pleasure	
that	she	judges	to	be	universally	valid,	the	subject	in	effect	judges	that	
any	subject	ought	to	combine	the	representation	of	the	beautiful	ob-
ject	with	a	feeling	of	pleasure.	
As	 I	 understand	 it,	 then,	 we	 need	 not	 read	 Kant	 as	 claiming	 at	
20:224	 that	 pleasure	 and	 displeasure	 are	 the	 only	 subjective	 sensa-
tions	tout court,	but	rather	that	they	are	the	only	sensations	that	play	
the	 role	of	 “subjective	predicates”	 in	aesthetic	 judgments.	 In	 fact,	 in	
the	very	sentence	preceding,	he	characterizes	aesthetic	judgments	in	
general	as	judgments	“whose	predicate	can	never	be	cognition”,	going	
on	 to	 identify	 the	 “predicate”	 in	question	as	pleasure	or	displeasure	
(20:224).	Once	again,	this	is	compatible	with	the	determining	ground	
of	 judgments	of	beauty	being	the	 independent	awareness	that	one’s	
faculties	are	in	harmony,	as	is	the	case	on	my	view.
25.	 See	Critique of Pure Reason,	B132–6.
26.	20:224;	5:191;	5:288;	5:289.
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In	addition	to	resolving	the	problem	of	§9,	distinguishing	the	feel-
ing	of	harmony	from	the	feeling	of	pleasure	can	remove	a	crucial	wor-
ry	for	Kant’s	“Deduction”	of	judgments	of	beauty.	I	explain	how	in	the	
next	section.
3 The Deduction of Judgments of Beauty
A	virtue	of	my	view	 is	 that	 it	 can	also	help	 to	 resolve	another	 long-
standing	 problem	 for	 Kant’s	 account	 of	 judgments	 of	 beauty.	 That	
problem	has	to	do	with	Kant’s	“Deduction”	of	judgments	of	beauty,	in	
which	Kant	 attempts	 to	 answer	 the	question	of	what	 entitles	 a	 sub-
ject	who	judges	an	object	 to	be	beautiful	 to	claim	that	others	ought	
to	agree	with	her	 judgment.	The	question	arises	 in	the	case	of	 judg-
ments	of	beauty	because	it	is	Kant’s	view,	as	we	have	seen,	that	such	
judgments	are	not	determined	by	concepts.	A	subject	can	legitimately	
demand,	for	example,	that	others	agree	with	her	when	she	judges	of	
some	shape	X	that	it	is	a	triangle,	if	she	can	cite	the	criteria	that	pick	
out	triangles,	and	prove	that	X	meets	them.	On	Kant’s	view,	however,	
it	is	not	possible	to	specify	a	set	of	features	that	any	and	all	beautiful	
objects	must	have.	Rather,	judgments	of	beauty	are	made	on	the	basis	
of	the	subject’s	feeling,	which	she	nevertheless	claims	everyone	ought	
to	share.	But	what	could	possibly	entitle	her	to	make	such	a	claim?
Now,	 in	 the	Deduction	(§38,	5:289–92),	Kant	argues	 that	as	 long	
as	she	has	made	a	pure	judgment	of	beauty,31	a	subject	is	entitled	to	
claim	that	others	agree	with	her	judgment.	A	full	explanation	of	the	
argument	of	the	deduction	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	The	fol-
lowing	sketch	of	it,	however,	should	be	sufficient	to	bring	the	problem	
into	view:
1.	 The	 pleasure	 in	 the	 beautiful	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	 har-
mony	of	the	faculties.
31.	 That	 is,	as	 long	as	she	does	not	allow	the	sensory	pleasantness	and/or	the	
suitability	 of	 the	 object	 for	 some	 practical	 or	 moral	 end	 to	 influence	 her	
judgment.
pleasure.	Such	a	psychological	exercise	is	at	odds,	however,	with	the	
normative	status	that	Kant	clearly	accords	judgments	of	beauty.29	As	
textual	support	for	the	intentionalist	reading,	commentators	point	out	
that	Kant	clearly	says	that	the	subject	can	become	aware	of	the	relation	
between	her	cognitive	faculties	through	feeling.30
Now,	the	account	I	have	been	developing	here	has	the	resources	
to	split	the	difference	between	the	causal	and	intentionalist	readings.	
Kant	clearly	does	allow	that	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	can	be	aes-
thetically	sensed;	as	mentioned	above,	he	characterizes	this	sensation	
as	the	“sensible	representation	of	the	state	of	the	subject”	(20:223,	see	
also	5:291).	 I	have	argued,	however,	 that	 this	sensation	is	not	 identi-
cal	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure;	rather,	as	Kant	goes	on	to	say,	pleasure	
is	combined	with	it.	On	my	view,	then,	it	is	the	 feeling of harmony	that	
undeniably	has	intentional	content:	 through	it,	 the	subject	becomes	
directly	 aware	 of	 the	 state	 of	 her	 cognitive	 faculties.	 This	 commit-
ment	—	in	contrast	with	views	on	which	the	feeling	of	pleasure	itself	is	
intentional	—	is	compatible	with	Kant’s	claim	that	the	subject	does	not	
cognize	anything	through	pleasure,	not	even	her	own	state.
It	is	true,	however,	that	the	intentionalist	reading	finds	some	sup-
port	in	the	passages	I	have	discussed	in	which	Kant	suggests	that	the	
judgment	of	beauty	itself	can	be	expressed	through	pleasure,	or	that	
pleasure	plays	the	role	of	a	“predicate”	in	a	judgment	of	beauty.	Ulti-
mately,	 I	believe	 that	Kant’s	 text	does	not	 fully	 settle	 the	 issue.	The	
virtue	of	my	account,	however,	is	that	it	can	reflect	this	ambiguity	and	
is	not	forced	to	choose	between	causal	and	intentionalist	construals	
of	pleasure.	On	my	view,	the	subject	becomes	aware	of	the	harmony	
of	her	faculties	through	an	independent	feeling	that	does	have	inten-
tional	 content;	 this	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 feeling	 of	 pleasure	 being	
caused	by	the	feeling	of	harmony	and/or	being	about	the	harmony	of	
the	faculties.
29.	See	Ginsborg,	“On	the	Key”,	38.
30.	See	20:223.	Allison	appeals	to	this	consideration	against	Guyer,	for	example	
(Allison,	“Pleasure	and	Harmony”,	468).
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Now,	 an	 important	 assumption	 that	 underlies	 the	 dilemma	 and	
generates	 its	 first	 horn	 is	 that	 the	 harmony	 of	 the	 faculties	 is	 itself 
pleasurable.	But	that	is	precisely	the	claim	that	I	have	denied	in	this	
paper.	In	§2,	I	argued	that	there	are	two	feelings	in	an	experience	of	
the	beautiful:	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties,	which	is	not	
itself	pleasurable,	and	an	independent	feeling	of	pleasure	that	is	con-
sequent	on	it.	If	this	is	correct,	then	the	dilemma	as	stated	above	is	a	
false	one.	For	if	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	not	itself	pleasurable,	
then	Kant	can	claim	that	it	is	a	necessary	condition	of	all	judgments	
without	generating	the	absurd	entailment	that	all	judgments	are	plea-
surable.	And	this	would	remove	one	of	the	biggest	obstacles	thought	
to	face	Kant’s	deduction.
Of	course,	if	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	accompanies	every	judg-
ment,	the	question	can	still	be	asked	why	it	should	give	rise	to	plea-
sure	only	in	the	case	of	the	beautiful.	Couldn’t	the	dilemma	be	restated,	
in	other	words,	as	turning	on	whether	the	awareness	of	the	harmony	
of	the	faculties	is	always	accompanied	by	the	feeling	of	pleasure,	even	if	
it	is	not	identical	with	it?
In	 this	 case,	 however,	 the	 entailment	 can	 be	 blocked	 by	 appeal-
ing	to	secondary	features	that	distinguish	the	aesthetic	case	from	the	
cognitive	one.	Though	both	involve	the	same	harmonious	relation	be-
tween	 the	cognitive	 faculties,33	 this	 relation	comes	about	differently	
attempts	 to	 rescue	 the	deduction	 as	 it	 is	 presented	 in	 §38	 are	—	or	 indeed,	
can	be	—	successful.	This	is	because,	as	he	sees	it,	the	only	way	to	block	the	
entailment	that	all	judgments	are	pleasurable	is	to	find	a	relevant	distinction	
between	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	that	accompanies	cognition	from	the	
harmony	that	accompanies	aesthetic	judgments	of	beauty.	But	then	what	is	
true	of	the	former	—	that	it	is	a	condition	on	cognition	—	need	not	be	true	of	
the	latter,	and	the	deduction	fails.	On	my	view,	as	will	become	clear,	the	need	
to	distinguish	cognitive	harmony	 from	aesthetic	harmony	does	not	arise.	 I	
discuss	this	further	in	n.	33.
33.	 This	is	a	key	advantage	of	a	view	that	distinguishes	the	feeling	of	harmony	
and	 the	 feeling	of	pleasure.	On	such	a	view,	 there	 is	no	need	 to	differenti-
ate	aesthetic	from	cognitive	harmony	in	order	to	avoid	the	first	horn	of	the	
supposed	dilemma	posed	by	the	deduction.	Instead,	we	can	preserve	Kant’s	
claim	 that	 there	 is	 just	one	 species	of	harmony	 that	 is	 instantiated	 in	both	
the	cognitive	and	the	aesthetic	case	and	that	is	always	universally	valid	with	
2.	The	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	a	necessary	condition	of	
judgment	in	general.
3.	The	necessary	 conditions	of	 judgment	 in	general	 are	
valid	for	all	judging	subjects.
4.	So,	the	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	is	valid	for	all	judging	
subjects.
Kant’s	 general	 strategy	 in	 the	 deduction	 of	 judgments	 of	 beauty,	
then	—	as	 in	his	 other	 deductions	—	is	 transcendental.	His	 argument	
relies	 on	 the	 claim	 that	 the	harmony	of	 the	 faculties	 is	 a	 necessary	
condition	of	judgment	in	general,	since	the	agreement	of	imagination	
and	understanding	is	necessary	for	any	act	of	cognition	to	occur.	From	
this	it	is	meant	to	follow	that	—	unlike	in	the	case	of	judgments	based	
merely	on	sensory	pleasantness	—	the	mental	state	 the	subject	 takes	
pleasure	 in	 in	a	 judgment	of	beauty	 is	one	 that	any	 judging	subject	
must	be	able	to	share.	If	her	state	is	genuinely	determined	merely	by	
the	conditions	on	 judging,	Kant	argues,	she	 is	entitled	 to	claim	that	
all	judging	subjects	ought	to	be	in	that	state.	And	this	is	supposed	to	
entitle	her	to	claim	that	all	other	subjects	ought	to	feel	the	pleasure	
she	does.
Now,	there	are	obviously	many	gaps	in	Kant’s	argument	as	I	have	
stated	it	here.	Rather	than	attempting	to	fill	in	these	gaps,	however,	I	
will	focus	on	one	problem	for	the	deduction	that	many	commentators	
have	taken	to	tell	decisively	against	it.	The	problem	has	been	put	in	
the	 form	of	 the	 following	dilemma:	Either	 the	harmony	of	 the	 facul-
ties	is	a	necessary	condition	of	judgment	in	general,	or	it	is	not.	If	it	is,	
and	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	 identical	to	a	feeling	of	pleasure,	
then	 every	 judgment	—	not	merely	 judgments	 of	 beauty	—	should	be	
pleasurable.	But	this	is	absurd.	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	harmony	of	
the	 faculties	 is	not	 a	 condition	on	 judgment	 in	 general,	 then	Kant’s	
argument	 fails	 to	provide	the	necessary	entitlement	 for	 the	claim	of	
universal	validity	made	by	a	judgment	of	beauty.32
32.	 For	a	helpful	discussion	of	various	attempts	to	respond	to	the	dilemma,	see	
Rind,	 “Can	Kant’s	Deduction	 Be	 Saved?”	 Rind	 concludes	 that	 none	 of	 the	
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to	the	requirements	of	the	understanding.	Such	an	unexpected	discov-
ery	could	quite	plausibly	be	regarded	as	grounds	for	pleasure.
On	my	view,	then,	Kant’s	deduction	can	be	saved	from	the	charge	
of	absurdity	 levied	 in	 the	first	horn	of	 the	so-called	dilemma	above.	
The	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	a	necessary	condition	of	judgments	of	
beauty	as	well	as	cognitive	judgments,	and	is	not	itself	pleasurable.	In	
the	case	of	cognitive	 judgments,	 the	harmony	is	brought	about	as	a	
result	of	the	subject’s	rule-governed	activity	of	synthesis	in	accordance	
with	concepts,	and	the	output	is	a	determinate	judgment	(for	example,	
“X	 is	a	triangle”),	not	a	feeling	of	pleasure.	In	the	case	of	beauty,	as	I	
have	discussed,	the	synthesis	of	the	imagination	is	not	determined	by	
a	concept,	but	is	nevertheless	discovered	to	be	in	harmony	with	the	
understanding.	Kant	can	consistently	claim,	then,	that	it	is	exclusively	
when	the	faculties	are	unintentionally	put	into	harmony	as	they	freely	
“play”	with	the	representation	of	the	beautiful	object	that	pleasure	is	
aroused.	But	since	the	harmonious	state	the	faculties	are	unintention-
ally	put	 into	 is	 the	very	same	state	 they	must	be	 in	 for	cognition	 in	
general,	Kant	can	argue	that	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	is	grounded	in	a	
universally	valid	state	and	is,	therefore,	itself	universally	valid.
Conclusion
To	sum	up,	I	have	defended	an	interpretation	of	Kant’s	account	of	judg-
ments	 of	 beauty	 on	which	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 beautiful	 involves	
two	separate	feelings:	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties,	and	
the	 feeling	 of	 pleasure.	 Distinguishing	 these	 two	 feelings,	 I	 argued,	
helps	 resolve	 two	 long-standing	 puzzles	 concerning	Kant’s	 account.	
The	first	puzzle	is	the	one	presented	by	Kant’s	apparently	conflicting	
claims	that	the	judgment	of	beauty	both	is	made	through	feeling	and	
grounds	the	feeling	in	the	beautiful.	 I	argued	that	it	 is	the	feeling	of	
harmony	that	grounds	judgments	of	beauty,	and	the	feeling	of	pleasure 
that	 is	consequent	on	them,	and	as	such,	 that	Kant’s	claims	are	con-
sistent.	The	second	puzzle	concerns	Kant’s	deduction	of	judgments	of	
taste,	and	the	worry	that	if,	as	he	argues,	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	
is	a	necessary	condition	of	all	judgments,	then	all	judgments	should	
in	 the	 two	 cases.	 First,	 as	 I	 have	 already	discussed,	 the	harmony	 in	
the	case	of	beauty	comes	about	freely:	the	activity	of	the	imagination	
is	not	 governed	by	 a	 concept	of	 the	understanding.	 Second,	 and	of	
a	piece	with	this,	the	faculties	in	the	case	of	beauty	are	said	to	be	in	
play:	their	agreement	is	brought	about	not	by	the	subject’s	intentional	
cognitive	 activity,	 but	 rather	unintentionally.	 The	product	of	 the	 free	
synthesis	of	the	imagination	that	is	triggered	by	its	attempt	to	repre-
sent	the	beautiful	object	just	happens	to	accord	with	the	conditions	of	
the	understanding.34	As	Kant	puts	it,	in	an	experience	of	beauty,	“the	
imagination	…	is	unintentionally	(unabsichtlich)	brought	 into	accord	
with	the	understanding	…	through	a	given	representation	and	a	feel-
ing	of	pleasure	is	thereby	aroused”	(5:190).
In	other	words,	 the	gap	that	my	view	opens	up	between	the	har-
mony	of	 the	 faculties	and	the	 feeling	of	pleasure	allows	 for	 the	con-
jecture	that	it	is	only	when	the	harmony	is	discovered	to	occur	while	
the	faculties	are	 in	a	state	of	 free	play	that	pleasure	is	aroused.	This	
conjecture	strikes	me	as	defensible:	we	can	see	why	there	would	be	
no	cause	for	pleasure	when	the	imagination	synthesizes	a	triangle,	say,	
under	 the	direction	of	 the	understanding’s	 concept	 “triangle”	and	 is	
for	that	reason	in	harmony	with	the	conditions	of	the	understanding.	
As	Kant	says,	when	it	is	“a	concept,	which	unite[s]	understanding	and	
imagination	in	the	judging	of	the	object	into	a	cognition	of	the	object,	
then	the	consciousness	of	this	relationship	[is]	intellectual”	(5:219).	In	
the	case	of	the	beautiful,	as	we	have	seen,	Kant	claims	that	since	no	
concept	 of	 the	 understanding	 is	 adequate	 to	 a	 beautiful	 object,	 the	
latter	triggers	a	free	synthesizing	on	behalf	of	the	imagination	that	is	
nonetheless	discovered,	through	the	feeling	of	harmony,	to	conform	
respect	to	the	object	that	produces	it.	As	such,	the	worry	raised	by	Rind	in	
“Can	Kant’s	Deduction	Be	Saved?”	(14–6)	does	not	arise.
34.	 There	are	obviously	genuine	questions	here	about	how	Kant	can	claim	that	
the	manifold	synthesized	by	the	imagination	in	an	experience	of	beauty	is	in	
accordance	with	 the	 lawfulness	of	 the	understanding,	even	 though	 the	un-
derstanding	does	not	succeed	in	bringing	the	beautiful	object	under	a	con-
cept.	But	responding	to	these	questions	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.
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